











































































































































































































































































































Name APP。intedcate ChamberDate　of　Birthgender BackgroundAcademic　Badkgr。und
1 Chie「コudgeJirou　SHIMADA
16／10／2006
i麗ajudge；07／11／2002） 22／11／1938 m Judge（President　of　thepsaka　High　Court）囲culty。f　Law，　Tbkyotnivcrsity










4 Judge Tbkuji　IZUMI06／11／2002 1 25／01／1941m Judge（President　of　theg）ky。　Hight　C・urt）Faculty　of　Law，　Ky。tQtnivcrsity
5 Judge Osamu　TSUNO26／02／2004 II 20／10／1938m Minister FaCulty　of　Law，　Kyototniversity








8 Judgc Yukio　HORIGOME17／05／2005 111 16／05／1940m Judge〔President　of　thens曲a　High　Court）F㏄ulty　of　Law，　Tbkyotniversity






10 Judge Kouhei　NASU25／5／2005 III 11／02／1942m Counsel 恥cu比y　of　Law，　Tbkyotniversity
11 Judge Norio　wakui 16／10／2006 1 11／02／1942m Judge（President　of　thens曲High　Court）恥culty。f　L乱w，　Kyototniversity
12 Judge Mutsuo　TAHARA01／11／2006 III 23／04／1943m Counsel Fac山y。f　Law，　Kyot。tniversiby
13 Judgc Takaharu　KONDOU23／05／2007 III 23／03／1944m Judge（President・frendai　High　Court）Faculty。f　Lawコbkyouiversity
14 Judge Kouji　MIYAGAwA03／09／2008 1 28／02／1942m Counse1 Graduate　Schoolilaw），　NRgoyεしUniversiLy
15 Judge Ryuk。　SAKURAI11／09／2008 1 16／01／1947 f Minister Facul七y　or　Law，jyushu　Univer6ity
R）rexample，　in　judgements　Upon　the，　constitutionality　of　the　electoral　system，　no七
few　judges　expressed七he　opinion　on　democracy　and　role　of七he　parliament（See，3）．
Propensity　toward　the　cita七ion　of　the　fbreign　law　or　foreign　case　law　by　the　courts
is　weak　in　general．
2．5． Importance　of　the　Law　Clerk　at　the　Supreme　Court
　　It　is　necessary　to　mention　the　importan七role　of　law　clerks　at　the　Supreme　Court．
They　are　judges　of　the　lower　courts　and七hey　are　nominated　as　law　clerks，　keeping
七heir　sta七us　as　judges．17　They　are　relatively　young　judges　who　worked　as　a　judge
f（）rabout　fifしeen　years　befbre　the　appointment　as　law　clerks．18　Law　clerks　read
case　records　and　submit　reports　to　the　judges　in　order　to　help　judges　screen　cases
（dismissal，　return　to七he　previous　cour七，　or　acceptance　as　a　Bench　case　or　a　Grand
Bench　case）．　Taking　into　accoun七七he　presen七宙orkload　of　the　Supreme　Court（it
receives　around　seven　thousand　cases　per　year）and　the　number　of　judges（15judges），
the　role　of　law　clerks　is　important，　There　is　a　speculation　that　law　clerks　may　play
more　substantial　role　in　deciding　whether　an　appeal　should　be　accepted　or　not　and
in　writing　a　draft　of　judgments七han　they　are　legi七imately　expec七ed　to．　Law　clerks
regularly　publish　the　case　comments　on　the　judgmen七s　of　the　Supreme　Court　iII　legal
journalS，
17Clerks　at　the　lower　courts　are　not　judges　and　recruited　by　the　different　qualification　examination．
181n　2006　there　were　341aw　clerks．
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2．6．　The　Rela七ionship　between　the　Constitutional　Legal　Scholarship
and　the　Courts
　　Constitutional　legal　scholars　have　shown　strong　in七erests　upon　the　foreign　law
and　ca8e　law　because　of　historical　background．　It　is　still　qui七e　common　that　when
young　scholars　enter　an　academic　life，　they　choose　one　of　the　western　coun七ries　as
an　obj　ect　of　a七horough　comparative　study（the　country　becomes　a“model　country”
for　them）．　There　are　advan七ages　and　disadvantages．　The　great　advantage　is　that
even　when　they　examine　purely　Japanese　issues，　they　consciously　or　subconsciously
look　a七issues　from　a　perspective　of　their　model　coun七ry．　Therefore，　it　is　likely
七ha七their　discussion　can　contain　a　compara七ive　analysis　simul七aneously．　On　the
contrary，　one　of　the　serious　disadvantages　is　a　limit　of　comparative　study　performed
by　a　scholar．　Since　specialisation　and　ramifica七ion　in　law　has　gone　deeper　and
further，　it　is　now　very　di田cult　to　become　a　specialist　of　more　than　one　country．
The　scholars　tend　to　concen七rate　on　one　specific　foreign　coun七ry　for　a　comparative
study．　Therefore　their　comparison　is　more　likely　to　become　an　unilateral　comparison
rather　than　a　multilateral　comparison．　When　a　comprehensive　comparative　research
including　many　countries　is　necessary，　it　has　to　be　performed　by　a　group　of　scholars．
The　problem七hey　have　to　encoun七er　is七hat　it　is　extremely　difHcult　to　agree　on
definitions　and　concepts　since　each　scholar　has　his／her　own　definition　and　concept
which　is　based　on　his／her　model　country．
　　The　discussion　concerning　introduc七ion　of　a　constitutional　court　in　Japan　is　a　good
example七〇explain　the　di缶cult　situation　above．　Scholars，　who　support　introduc－
tion　of　a　constitutional　court　in　Japan　as　a　solution　to　change　the　passive　Supreme
Court，　often　refer　to　constitutional　courts　in　Europe，　particularly　the　German　Con－
stitutional　Court，　It　is　often七he　case　that　their　model　countries　are　continental
European　countries　that　have　constitutional　cour七s．　On　the　o七her　hand　scholars
who　study　the　US　Constitution　are　more　sceptical　toward　a　constitutional　court．
　　The　concept　of　human　rights　is　also　heavily　infiuenced　by　model　countries．　Iron－
ically　it　can　happen　that　the　definition　and　concept　Professor　A　uses（assume　that
Professor　A，s　model　country　is　Germany）is　di伍cult　to　understand　for　Professor　B
whose　model　country　is七he　UK　which　was　his七〇rically　reluctant　to　codify　human
rights　into　a　general　abstract　document．　Therefore　the　Europeanization　of　law　is　a
very　interesting（and　probably　helpful）phenomenon　for　Japanese　scholars．
　　The　lillk　be七ween　the　legal　scholarship　of　constitutional　law　and　the　courts　has
been、w6ak．　There　are　several　reasons．　Firstly，　the　Japanese　system　of　nomination
and　promotion　of　judges　is　so　bureaucratic　that　it　encourages　judges　to　stay　in　the
circle　of　judges，　but　not　outside．19　The　judges　and　prosecutors（they　consist　of
majority　a七the　Supreme　Court　a880ut　of　15）who　enable　to　reach　the　Supreme
Cour七are　more　likely七〇　be　traditional　and　conserva七ive　minded．
　　Secondly，　judges　are　very　careful　no七七〇show　their　political　viewpoint　in　order　to
keep　them七〇be　seen　as　neutral　and　independent．　Constitutional　matters　are　often
19Supreme　Court（Grand　Chamber，　hereinafしer　GB），judgement　of　l　December　1998（Judiciary　Disciplinary
　Action　case，　see，3．2．L1），　Sαikou　Sαibαnsんoハ4inji　Hanreisんu（hereinafter　Minshzの52－9－1761．
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poli七ical　and　controversial．　Therefore，　they　are七he　most　di缶cult　for七hem　to　discuss
in　public．20　The　Supreme　Court　has　always　oIle　academic　judge　among　members．
However，　when　academics　work　as　judges，　they　are　likely　to　maintain　s七atus　quo
rather　than　propose　a　reform　which　they．would　have　suppor七ed　as　academics．21
　　Thirdly，　as　the　academic．comparative　study　is　very　country－orien七ed，　it　is　not　so
easy　to　evalua七e　i七from　a　wider　perspective．　This　is　the　problem　that　legal　academics
need七〇rethink．
　　The　weak　link　between　constitutional　scholars　and　judges　is　related　to　the　weak
propensity　of　judges　toward　the　f（）reign　law　in　general．　The　constitutional　academics
have　criticised　the　Supreme　Court　on　two　poin七s　from　a　perspective　of　comparative
study．　First，　it　is　inappropriate　that　the　Supreme　Court　does　no七refer　to　nor　take
into　account　the　US　case　law　in　a　clearer　way　despite　the　similarities　of七he　issues　and
contexts．　Secondly，　how　the　Supreme　Cour七uses　the　US　case　law（in　a　hidden　way
（see，4））is　misunderstood　or　even　wrong．　In　my　view，　foreign　case　law（par七icularly，
七he　US　case　law）some七imes　plays　a　crucial　role　in　deducing　legal　reasoning　and
cons七itu七ionali七y七ests“from　a　back　door”．　I　shall七ry　to　show　some　examples　Iater
（see，4）．　I　would　like　to　add七hat　the　comparative　s七udy　has　been　a　useful　source　for
七he　appellants　who　bring　constitutional　cases　to　the　courts．
3． Empirical　research
3．1． Quantitative　ApProach
　　There　is　no　explicit　citation　of　fbreign　case　law　or　foreign　law　in　the　majority
opinion　of　the　judgments　and　decisions　of　the　Supreme　Court　of　Japan．
　　There　are七wo　interesting　examples　in七he　majority　opinions　of　the　Supreme　Court
in　which　the　word“Shogaikoku”（foreign　countries）is　used．　The　details　are　explained
in　3．2ユ．
　　There　are　seven　cases　ill　which　di3senting　opinions　referred　to　foreign　law　or　case
law　and　four　cases　in　which　concurring（supplementary）opinions　referred七〇fbreign
law　or　case　law．
3．2． Qualitative　ApProach
　　There　is　no　systematic　method　of　citation　or　reference　of　fbreign　law　or　case
law．　Therefore，　I　describe　how　foreign　law　or　case　law　is　men七ioned　in　each　case．　I
explain　2　cases　in　which　majority　opinions　used　words　as“foreign　countries”，7・cases
in　which　dissenting　opinions　mentioned　foreign　case　law，　foreign　law　or　legal　practice
and　4　cases　in　which　concurring（supplementary）opinions　men七ioned　fbreign　case
201d．
21Aprofessor　of　Anglo－American　and　Constitutional　Law　confessed　in　his　book　which　he　published　afしer　he
　retired　from　the　Supreme　Court　that　his　views　as　an　academic　and　his　views　as　a　judge　of　the　Supreme
　Court　were　different　due　to　the　task　and　role　of　the　judge　of　the　Supreme　Court．　His　opinion　as　a　judge
　in　several　crucial　cases　disappointed　other　academics　who　expected　to　see　more　radical　judgments　as　the
　academic　judge　was　considered　as　liberal　and　a　strong　supporter　of　freedom　of　expressiol1．　Masami　Ito，
　Saibankan　to　Gakusha　no　Aida（Between　the　Judge　and　the　Academic）（Yuhikaku，1993）．
The　Enigmatic　Attitude　of　the　Supreme　Court　of　Japan　towards　F（）reign　Precedents29
1aw，　foreign　law　or　legal　practice．　The七〇七al　number　of　cases　which　refer七〇fbreign
law　or　case　law　is　twelve．
3．2．1． Majority　Opinion
3．2．1．1． Judicial　Disciplinary　Action（1　December　1998）22
　　The　case　is　concerned　wi七h七he　disciplinary　ac七ion　against　a　judge　who　participated
in　a　symposium　concerning　a　controversial　Communication　lnterception　Bill（at七hat
tim・）・23　Th・m・j・・ity・pi・i・n　h・1d　th・t　l・g・1・e・t・i・ti・P・and　p…tice　i・“f・・eig・
countries”，　which　adopt　a　more　relaxed　attitude　towards　individual　activities　of
judges　can　be　one　of　references　but　it　is　not　possible　to　apply　them　direc七ly　to　Japan．
3．2．1．2．　Nationality　Law（4　June　2008）24
　　In七his　case　the　words“foreign　countries”is　used　on　both　sides：七he　majority
opinion　and　dissenting　opinion．　The　case　is　concerned　with　the　legal　s七atus（nation－
ali七y）of　a　child　who　was　born　out　of　wedlock　between　a　Philippine　mother　and　a
Japanese　father　who　legally　admi七ted　tha七he　was　the　father　of　the　child．　The　Mil1－
ister　of　Jus七ice　had　refused　the　application　for　Japanese　nationality．　The　majority
opinion　held　that　the　child　was　entitled七〇acquire　Japanese　nationality　according　to
the　constitutional　interpretation　of　the　Nationality　Law，　mentioning　the　exis七ence
of　law　reforms　in“f〈）reign　countries”abolishing　unequal　status　between　a　legitimate
alld　an“illegi七imate”child．
　　On　the　contrary，　the　dissenting　opinion（Judges　Ybkoo，　Tsuno　and　Furuta）dis－
agreed　with　the　majority　opinion　on　this　point．　It　argued　it　was　not　appropriate　to
七ake　into　account七he七rend　in　Wes七ern　countries，　par七icularly　European　coun七ries
since　there　were　more　interna七ional　marriages　because　of　geographical　and　historical
situation　and　regional　in七egration　was　intensified　by　the　development　of　the　EU．
3．2．2． Dissenting　Opinion
3．2．2．1． “Illegitima七e　Child”（lnheritance）（5　July　1995）25
　　The　case　is　concerned　with　the　constitutionality　of　the　Japanese　Civil　Law　which
prescribes　a　different　treatment　between　a　legitimate　child　and　a　child　born　ou七〇f
wedlock　as　to七he　legal　allocation　of　inheritance　for　the　situation　when　the　deceased
person　does　Ilo七leave　a　testamen七〇r　there　is　a　disagreement　concerning　the　allocation
of　inheritance．　The　law　provides　that　an“illegitimate”child　is　entitled七〇inheri七a
half　of　the　allocation　of　inheritance　to　which　a　legitimate　child　is　entitled．
　　The　majori七y　opinion　denied　unconstitutionality　by　admit七ing　a　wide　discre七ion
七〇　the　legisla七ure．　However，　i七was’　a　controversial　case　as七he　Tokyo　High　Court　had
struck　down　the　legislation　as　uncons七itutional　in　the　same　case　and　the　Supreme
22Supreme　Court（GB），judgment　of　l　December　1998，、Minshu　52－9－161．
23The　organiser　of　the　symposium　dealt　with　the　Bill　from　a　critical　viewpoint　and　the　judge　in　question
　had　sent　a　letter　to　a　newspaper　to　raise　the　question　against　the　Bill，
24Supreme　Court（GB），judgement　of　4　June　2008，　Hαnrei　Jiho　2002－13．
25Supreme　Court（GB），judgement　of　5　July　1995，　Minshu　49－17－89．
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Court　judgement　itself　accompanied　five　dissenting　opinions　and　five　concurring
（supPlementary）opinions．
　　Interestingly，　both　of　the　dissenting　opinions　and　concurring　opinions　mentioned
foreign　case　law　and／or　foreign　law．　Judge　Kabe’s　concurring　opinion　said　that　the
issue　in　question　was　not　the　propriety　of　the　legislation　denying　entitlement　of　an
“illegitimate”child　as　an　heir　as　the　American　legisla七ion　in　question　does，　but　the
propriety　of　the　allocation　of　inheritance　on七he　premise　that　an“illegitimate”child
can　be　one　of　the　heirs．　His　usage　of　foreign　law　and　case　law　can　be　classified　as
“an　example　no七to　be　followed（αcontrario）”in　a　broader　sense．
　　Judge　Onishi’s　concurring　opinions　also　mentioned　the　legal　reform　in　abolishing
unequal　s七a七us　of　an“illegitimate”child　but　he　denied　unconstitutionality　of　the　law
by　emphasising　the　necessity　of　delicate　balance　between　private　parties，　interes七s
pro七ected　by七he　Civil　Law．
　　On七he　contrary　dissenting　opinion　of　five　judges　strengthened　their　reasoning　by
pointing　out　that　it　was　a　general　trend　in“foreign　countries”that　legal　distinc一
七ion　between　the　legitimate　and“illegitimate，，　child　became　unreasonable　and　legal
reform　in　order　to　treat　them　equally　occurred　since　the　1960s．
3．2．2．2．　Election（House　of　Councilors）（2　Septemb6r　1998）26
　　The　case　is　concerned　with　the　constitutionality　of　the　disparity　of　value　of　vote
among　constituencies　of　the　Election　of七he　House　of　Councilors　from七he　viewpoint
of　equality　principle（Art　140f　the　Constitution）．　Due　to　the　rapid　urbanisation
more　and　more　people　moved　from　rural　areas　to　city。　Consequently，　substantial
value　of　one　vote　varies，　depending　on　where　electors　live．　The　maximum　disparity
between　an　urban　constituency　and　a　rural　consti七uency　reached　1：4．99．
　　The　majori七y　opinion　admi七七ed七he　cons七i七utionali七y　of　the　Election　Law，　admit－
ting　a　wide　discretion　to　the　legislature．　However，　five　dissenting　opinions　were
expressed．　The　dissen七ing　opinions　of　Judge　Ozaki　and　Fukuda　argued　that　the
acceptable　disparity　had　to　be　remained　from　10％to　20％（七heref6re七he　presen七
disparity　was　unconstitutional），　referring　to　the　situations　of　the　US，　the　UK，　Ger－
many　and　France　and　their　case　law　concerning　the　acceptable　disparity．　In七eres七一
ingly　the　opinion　also　referred　to　the　academic　writings　which　are　rarely　referred　at
the　Supreme　Court．
3．2．2．3．　Election（House　of　Representatives）（10　November　199g）127
　　The　case　is　concerned　with　the　cons七i七utiQnality　of　the　disparity（1：2．309）of　value
of　vote　among　cpnstituencies　of　the　Election　of　the　House　of　Representatives．　The
majority　opinion　held　i七cons七i七u七ional　bu七it　was　a　controversial　judgment　as　five
dissenting　opinions　were　added．
　　The　dissen七ing　opinion　of　Judge　Fukuda　interestingly　stated“i七is「impossible　to
adopt　an　argument　that　the　interpretation　of　the　Cons七i七ution　of　Japan　has　to　be
done　according　to　the　case　law　accumulated　by七he　Japanese　judiciary　and　it　is
26Supreme　Court（GB），　judgement　of　2　September　1998，　Minshu　52－6－1373．
27Supreme　Court（GB），　judgement　of　10　November　1999，　Minshu　53－8－1441．
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not　necessary　to　consider　experiences　in　foreign　countries．”　Then，　he　expanded
七he　objec七s　for　comparison　from　the　USA，七he　UK，　France　and　Germany　which
he　had　referred　in　the　judgemen七〇f　2　September　1998（see，3．2．2．2）to　Italy　and
Canada　which　also　managed　to　maintain　the　disparity　less　than　25％．　Consequently，
he　claimed七ha七七he　examples　of　other　countries　were　ex七remely　helpfUl七〇see　how
lightly　the　principle　of　equality　of　the　Japanese　Constitution　was　taken　in　the　election
of　Parliamen七and七〇　what　extent　i七was　possible　to　amend七he　current　situation　in
order　to　achieve七he　goal（1：1）as　close　as　possible．
3．2．2．4． Election（House　of　Representatives）（10　November　1999）II28
　　The　case　is　concerned　with　cons七i七utionality　of　the　newly　reformed　elec七〇ral　system
as　the　majority　system．29　This　was　also　a　controversial　case　as　five　judges　wrote
dissen七ing　opinions．　Judge　Fukuda　repea七ed　what　he　said　as七he　dissenting　opinion
in　3．2．2．3．
3．2．2。5． Election（House　of　Councilors）（6　September　2000）30
　　The　case　is　concerned　with七he　constitutionali七y　of　the　disparity（1：4．99）of　vote
value　among　cons七i七uencies　of　the　Election　of　the　House　of　Councilors．　The　majority
held　i七constitutional，　admi七ting　a　wide　discre七ion　of　Parliament　but丘ve　dissenting
opinions　were　expressed．
　　The　dissenting　opinion　of　Judge　Fukuda　emphasised　the　importance　of七he　judicial
review　as　a　mechanism　to　examine　whether七he　legislation　made　by　the　legislature
based　on　considerations　of　policies　was　cons七itutionally　incompatible　or　not，　men－
tioning七he　role　of　judicial　review　of　o七her　countries．　He　pointed　out七he　necessity
of　changes　in七he　precedent．
3．2．2．6． Election（House　of　Councilors）（14　January　2004）31
　　The　case　is　concerned　with　the　constitu七ionality　of　the　disparity（1：5．06）of　vote
value　among　constituencies　of　the　Election　of　the　House　of　Councilors．　The　Majority
held　it　constitutiona1，　admittiIlg　a　wide　discretion　of　Parliament．　However　the　con一
七ent　of　the　judgment　became　more　complicated　than　the　judgement　of　6　September
2000（see，3．2．5）since　six　judges　expressed　dissenting　opinions　and．nine　judges　who
agreed　with　the　majority　opinion　wro七e　concurring　opinions．
　　The　dissenting　opinion　of　Judge　Fukuda　strongly　argued　for　necessity　of　a　judge－
men七admitting　unconstitutionali七y　of　the　present　disparity　existing　at　the　con－
stituencies　of　the・House　of　Councilors．　He　emphasised　that　disparity　of　vote　value
was七aken　seriously　in七he　USA，　Germany　and　Italy　as　he　did　in　previous　cases（see，
3・2・2・3，3・2・2・4・32・2・5），citing　judgements　of七he　US　Supreme　Court　as“judgment
of　1962”and“judgement　of　1983”（he　did　not　give　the　ci七ation　detail）．　Moreover　he
28Supreme　Court（GB），judgement　of　10　NQvember　1999，　Minshu　53－8－1704．
2gAft・・th・p・liti・・1　scandal・nd　uph・aval，　th・p・liti・・1・ef・・m　t・・k・pla£e　in・1994．　One・f　the　measu，e、　f。，
　reform　was　change　of　the　electoral　system　from　medium－sized　constituency　system　to　mixed　mechanism
　of　majority　system（300　seats）and　proportional　representative　system（200　seats，　later　180　seats），
30Supreme　Court（GB），judgement　of　6　September　2000，　Minshu　54－7－1997．・
31Supreme　Court（GB），judgement　of　14　January　2004，ハ4inshu　58－1－56．
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suggested　that　if七he　Court　continued　to　avoid　declaring　the　present　disparity　as　un－
constitutiona1，　it　would　trigger　an　argument　for　a　constitutional　court　alld　the　Cour七
would　lose七he　power　of　judicial　review　since　the　Court　was　considered　as　useless
for　pro七ec七ing　democratic　governmen七whose　healthy　condition　was　fundamen七ally
guaranteed　by　judicial　review．
　　The　dissen七ing　opinion　of　Judge　Kajitani　also　men七ioned　that　the　equality　principle
of　vote　value　was　rigorously　pro七ec七ed　in　Western　democratic　countries．　Particularly
he　poin七ed　out　the　fact七ha七七he　US　Supreme　Court　held　that“one　person　one　vo七e”
principle　had七〇be　apPlied　in　the　elections　and　since　1963七he　principle　has　been
rigorously　apPlied．1七should　be　noted　that　Judge　Kajitani　referred七〇the　dissenting
opinion　of　the　judgmen七〇f　2　September　1998（see，3．2．2．2）．
3．2．2．7．　Nationality　Law（4　June　2008）32→see，3．2．1．2
3．2．3． Concurring（SupPlementary）Opinion
3．2．3．1． “lllegitimate　Child”（Inheritance）（5　July　1995）33→see，3．2．2．1
3．2．3．2． Separation　of　Government　and　Religion（砿ici七6）（2　April　1997）34
　　The　case　is　concerned　with　the　constitutionality　of　the　act　of　a　local　governmen七
which　paid　the　fee　for　offerings七〇the　Yasukuni　shrine，　a　principal　Shinto　shrine　in
Japan．　The　Constitution　of　Japan　provides　the　freedom　of　religion（Ar七20）and七he
separa七ion　of　government　and　religion　in　order　to　ensure　religious　liberty（Art　20　and
89）．The　issue　is　whether　the　local　government，s　payment　is　considered　as　a　religious
act　which　is　prohibited　under　the　Constitution　or　as　a　social　custom　which　the
J．apanese　people　may　expect　the　local　government　to　follow．　Historical　background
of　the　case　is　that　before　and　during　World　War　II　the　Yasukuni　shrine　played　an
impor七ant　spiri七ual　and　religious　role　in　maintaining　the　governmen七policy，　which
was　undemocratic　and　mili七aris七ic，　and　the　governmen七〇ften　suppressed　freedom　of
other　religions．
　　It　is　noteworthy　that　the　Supreme　Court　previously　established　a　constitutionality
test（purpose－effect　test）concerning　the　principle　of　separation　of　governl皿ent　and
religioh　in　the　judgement　of　13　July　1977（See，4．2．3）．　It　was　considered　that　the
Court　consulted　the　Lemonちes七〇f　the　US　SUpreme　C6urt　although　the　citation　was
not　found　in　the　judgemen七．　In七he　judgmen七〇f　13　July　1977　the　Court　held　that
local　government　did　not　breach　the　Constitution　as　a　result　of　the　application　of
・the　test．　The　conclu串ion　and　the　test　itself　were　severely　criticised　by　the　academics．
They　claimed　that　the　test（or　how　the　test　was　applied）was　so　broad　and　ambiguous
that　it　could　not　control　government　activity　in　order　to　make　sure　to　guarantee　the
protection　of　freedom　of　religion．　On　the　contrary，　in　the　1997　judgment，　the　Court
32Supreme　Court（GB），judgement　of　4　June．2008，　Hαnrei　Jiho　2002－13．
33Supreme　Court（GB），judgement　of　5　July　1995，　Minshu・49－17－89．
34Supreme　CQurt（GB），judgement　of　2　Apri11997，　Minshu　51－4－1673．
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admi七ted　tha七七he　local　government　breached　the　Cons七itution．　Therefore，　it　is
interesting　to．　see　whether　the　Supreme　Court　maintained七he　previous　tes七（bu七
facts　are　differen七）or　developed　the　previous　preceden七into　a　stric七er　test．
　　The　concurring　but　complementary　opinions　of　Judge　Takahashi　and　Ozaki　are
noteworthy　on七his　point．　They　criticised　the　purpose－effect　test　as　too　obscure　to
decide七he　extent　of　cons七i七utionally　permissible　relationship　be七ween　government
and　religion．　Judge　Takahashi　suppor七ed　the　absolu七e　separation　of　government
and　religion　and　proposed　a　new　test　tha七i七was　not　permissible　for　government
七〇be　involved　wi七h　any　religion　unless　the　complete　separation　was　impossible　or
lnapProprlate．
　　Judge　Ozaki，　who　shared　the　same　view（absolute　separation）with　Judge　Taka－
hashi，　pointed　ou七an　interes七ing　comparison．　He　stated　tha七it　was　wrong　to　adop七
七he　purpose－effect　test　just　because　of　apparent　similarities　of　the　Amendment　Clause
lof　the　CQnstitution　of　US　and　Article　200f　the　Consti七ution　of　Japan．　In　his　view
the　American　Constitution　provides　wha七is　prohibited　under　the　Consti七u七ion（he
cited七he　words　of　the　American　Cons七i七ution）．　Theref（）re　it　is　necessary　to　make
i七clear　what　is　prohibited　and　es七ablish　a　tes七for　that　purpose．　On　the　contrary
七he　Japanese　Constitution　prohibi七s　all　the　religious　acts　of　government．　Therefore，
it　is　logical　to　prescribe　narrowly　what　is　permissible　as　an　exception　under　the
Cons七itution　on七he　premise七ha七all　religious　acts　are　prohibited．　In　his　words，
governmel1七must　not　involve　with　an　ac七whose　religious　nature　is　suspec七ed　unless
there　is　clearly　a　highly　legal　interes七which　would　permit　an　exception　to七he　sepa－
ra七ion　principle．　How　he　used七he　US　Colls七i七ution　can　be　classified　as“an　example
not七〇be　fbllowed（a　contrario）”in　a　broader　sense．
3．2．3．3．　“lllegitimate”Child（lnheritance）（27　January　2000）135
　　The　case　is　concerned　with七he　constitutionality　of　the　Japanese　Civil　Law　as
aforementioned．　The　concurring　opinion　of　Judge　Fujii　generally　mentioned　the
trend　of　legislation　in“foreign　countries”and　ra七ification　of　international　human
rights　treatie呂in　the　contex七〇f　analysing　the　background　of　influen七ial　opinions
which　were　scep七ical　towards七he　law．　He，　however，七〇〇k　the　discree七attitude　as　a
judge　and　gave　a　wider　discretion　to　the　legislature．
3．2．3．4．　‘‘Illegitimate”Child（Inheritance）（27　January　2000）II36
The　issue　is　the　same　as　32．3．3．　Judge　Fujii　repeated　the　same　concurring　opinion．
3．3． Analysis
　　Despite七he　fact　that　appellan七s　often　cite　or　refer　to　foreign　law　or　case　law
which　reinforces　their　arguments　and　submi七s　academic　papers　as　evidence，　it　is　very
unlikely　that　foreign　law　or　case　law　influences　on　the　judgement　of七he　Supreme
Court　in　an　explicit　way．
　　There　are，　however，　some　exceptions．　First，　when　the　gap　between　the　Japanese
35Supreme　Court，　judgement　of　27　January　2000，　Hαnre乞」抗01260－6．
36Supreme　Court，　judgement　of　27　January　2000，καオe乞θα琶6αη5んoσeppo　52－7－78．
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law　and　foreign　laws　are　very　wide，　the　comparison　be七ween　them　catches　the　at一
七ention　of　judges　who　disagree　with　the　majority　opinion．　The　good　examples　are
cases　concerning　disparity　of　vo七e　value　（see，3222，3．2．2．3，3．2．2．5　and　322．6）
among　constituencies　and　cases　concerning　legal　distinction　of　legitimate　child　and
“illegi七ima七e”child（see，3．2．2．1　and　3．2．2．7）．
　　In七he　former　example，　dissenting　opinions　of　the　Supreme　Cour七strongly　claimed
the　unconstitutionality　of　the　Election　Law　by　widely　referring　to　fbreign　laws　and
case　laws，　such　as　the　USA，　the　UK，　Germany，　France，　Italy　and　Canada　in　order
to　show七he　fact七hat　permissible　disparity　in　western　democratic　countries　were　far
much　narrower　than七he　Japanese　one．
　　In　the　lattgr　example，　the　dissenting　opinion　also　referred　to　the　general　trend　in
foreign　coun七ries　of　abolishing　the　legal　dis七inction　between　legitimate　and‘‘illegiti－
mate”child　and　supported　the　appellants，　claim　df　unconstitutionality．
　　Interestingly，　not　only　dissenting　opinion　but　also’　majority　opinion　mentioned　the
legal　trend　in　f（）reign　countries　to　strengthen　the　conclusion　of　uncons七i七u七ionality
in　the　Na七ionali七y　I、aw　case（see，3．2．1．2）．
　　Secondly，　although七here　is　a　gap　between　Japanese　law　and　foreign　law　and
probably七he　gap　is　so　enormous，　some　judges　fel七〇bliged七〇emphasise　tha七it
was　important　to　respect　the　differences　be七ween　Japan　and　foreign　countries（see，
3．2．3．1，3．2．3．3and　3．2．3．4）．
　　It　can　be　pointed　out　that　dissenting　opinions　are　more　likely七〇refer七〇foreign
law　or　case　law　than　majori七y　opinion　and　concurring　opinion．　The　reason　can　be
presumed　that　it　is　helpful　fbr七he　dissenting　opinion　to　point　out　that　foreign　law　or
case　law　of　foreign　coun七ries　which　has　been　basis　of　the　Japanese　law　would　provide
adifferent　answer　which　the　dissenting　opinion　supports．　On　the　contrary，　because
of　minimalistic　attitude　of　the　Supreme　Cour七〇f　Japan　if　the　Court　cah　derive　the
conclusion　from　the　Japanese　law　and　case　law　of七he　Supreme　Court　of　Japan　and
the　conclusion　is　compatible　with　the　foreign　law　and　case　law，　then　the　Court　can
rely　on　its　own　case　law　and　i七is　not　the　usual　approach　for　the　Cour七七〇cite七he
foreign　law　or　case　law．
4． Hidden　Influences
4．1． What　are“Hidden　lnfluences”？
　　In　this　section　I　discuss　cases　in　which　majority　opinions　do　not　cite　or　refer　to
foreign　case　law　or　foreigII　law　in　an　explicit　way　but　the　reasoning　or／and　a　test
（standard）of　constitutionality　is　so　similar　to　an　existing　foreign　case　law　that　it
is　di缶cult　to　deny　the　existence　of　influences．　In　other　words，　the　similarities　are
so　strong　that　it　can　be　classified　as　direc七in且uences　if　the　Court　only　added　the
formal　citation．
　　In　order　to　cover七he　mos七appropria七e　examples　for　hidden　infiuences　and　depic七
an　interesting　charac七eristics　of　case　law　of　the　Supreme　Cour七，　in　this　section　I
enlarge　the　time　period　to　include　earlier　cases’which　are　not　covered　by　the　time
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period　as　I　explained。　Examples　in　this　section　are　not　exhaustive．
　　Presently　I　can　think　of　three　sources　of　hidden　influences．　First，　the　appellants
often　cite　or　refer七〇foreign　case　law　or　foreign　law　to　reinforce　their　argument
although　it　is　unlikely　that　judges　adopts七heir　argument　based　on　foreign　legal
authorities．
　　Secondly，　some　judges　whose　backgrounds　are　acaderpic七end七〇have　more　com－
parative　legal　knowledge．　The　good　example　is　Judge　Ito　who　was　fbrmerly　an
Anglo－American　law　professor　of　Tokyo　Universi七y　before　he　was　appointed　as　a
judge　of　the　Supreme　Cour七．　Therefore　his　reasoning　and　even　a　tes七〇f　constitu－
tionality　are　s七rongly　influenced　by　his　study　on　the　US　case　law（see，4．2．4）．
　　Lastly，　it　can　be　presumed　that　law　clerks　may　prepare　some　comparative　law
ma七erials　including　fbreign　law　and　case　law　which　are　relevant　in　a　par七icular　case
in　question．　Even　it　is　possible七〇speculate　that　when　law　clerks　support　a　drafting
process　of　judgements，　their　knowledge　of　foreign　case　law，　particularly　the　US　case
law　might　indirectly　in且uence　on　the　process．　It　looks　more　relevan七when　the　fact
is　taken　in七〇account　that　the　law　clerks　are　in　the　late　30s　or　early　40s．　Many　of
them　studied　cons七itu七ional　law　by　using　textbooks　wri七ten　by　academis　who　have
been　influenced　by　the’tS　constitutional　case　law．　The　best　example　is　a七extbook
written　by　Professor　Ashibe　of　Tokyo　Universi七y　who　was　keen　on　activating　the　role
of　the　Supreme　Court　as　a　guardian　of七he　Constitution　and　human　rights　after　his
comparative　study　in　the　United　States．37
　　1t　should　be　noted七ha七in　the　1980s　the　theme　of　judicial　review　became　very
popular　among　scholars　and七he　thorough　compara七ive　s七udy　on　the　US　case　law
has　continued　since　then．　Particularly　aforemen七ioned　Professor　Ashibe　played　an
important　role　in　making　the　judiciary　become　familiar　with　a　uniformed　way　of
adjudicating　constitutional　cases，　by　suggesting　various　tests（standards）of　cons七i－
tutionality　which　he　learned　from七he　US　case　law．　The　immediate　in且uellce（how
his　effor七s　were　successful）was　limited　and　the　Supreme　Court　does　not　adop七七he
same　tests　of　cons七itutionality　as　Professor　Ashibe　promo七ed．　However，　if　I　compare
the　judgments　of　the　earlier　period　and　the　current　judgments，　the　differences　exist．
The　reasoning　of　the　judgments　became　clearer　and　some　collstitutionality　tes七s　are
recognised　although　the　constitutional　legal　scholars　still　criticise　ambiguity　of　the
reasoning　and　cons七itutionality　test．　Judges　are　more　concerned　with　the　harmony
between　the　consistency　of　judgments　and　the　cons七i七utional　role　of　judges　as　a　last
resort　to　protect　human　rights（see，3．2．1．2　and　3．2．2。6）．　Because　of　accumulation
of　judgements　they　put　themselves　in　a　situation　that　they　are　not　only　required七〇
give　an　answer　to　a　case　in　question　but　also　required　to　make　precedent　consistent
and　persuasive．　Al七hough　the　judicial　change　takes　more　time　to　emerge　and　it　is
sub七le　in　the　Japanese　context，　it　does　happen　in　my　view．38
37NQbuyoshi　Ashibe，　Constitutional　Law（4th　ed．　Iwanami，2007）is　a　long　seller　as　a　constitutional　law
　textbook　in　Japan．
381n　September　2008，　a　judge　of　the　Supreme　Court　who　was　born　after　World　War　II　was　appointed　for
　the　first　time．
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4．2． Some　Examples
4．2．1．　Pharmacies，　Location　Regulation（30　April　1975）39：Level　of
Scrutiny　and　the　Footnote　Four　of　Carolene　Products　Case
　　The　case　was　concerned　with　the　legal　regulation　on　locations　of　pharmacies　by　the
Pharmaceutical　Affairs　Act．　In　the　beginning　of　the　judgement，　the　majority　opinion
emphasised七he　difference　be七ween　freedom　to　choose　occupation　and　freedom　of
“mental”activities（freedom　of　conscience，　religion　and　expression）．
　　Indeed，　because　occupa七ion，　as　previously　sta七ed，　is　in　essence　a　social
and，　moreover，　principally　an　economic　activity，　and　by　its　na七ure　something
in　which　mutual　social　relations　are　great；in　comparison　to　other　cons七itu一
七ionally　guaranteed　freedoms，　especially七he　so－called‘‘mental”freedoms，　the
demand　fbr　regulation　by　public　authority　is　stronger．　Thus　the　recognition
under　article　22，　paragraph　l　of　the　Cons七itu七ion　of　freedom　of　occupa七ional
choice　with　the　reservation，“to　the　ex七en七that　it　does　not　interfere　wi七h　the
public　welfare，”may　be　considered　to　derive　from　an　intent　to　emphasize　this
point　in　particular．40
　　The　academic　scholar　understood　the　judgement　in　a　sense　that　the　Court　admit－
ted　the　supremacy　of　freedom　of　expression　and七herefore，　when　the　Court　examines
the　collstitu七ionali七y　of　restrictions　upon　freedom　of　expression，　it　does　so　more
carefully　by　using　stric七er七ests．　Therefore，　they　claimed七ha七七he　Supreme　Court
of　Japan　accepted　the　idea　of　level　of　judicial　scrutiny　depending　on七he　characters
of　rights　as　the　US　Supreme　Court　did．　As　I　explained　before，　efforts　of　Japanese
constitutional　scholars　in七roduced　the　idea　of　level　of　scrutiny　into　Japanese　consti－
tutional　legal　study．　However，　i七is　not　clear　the　Supreme　Cour七knew　the　footnote
fbur　of七he　Uni七ed　States　v．　Carolene　Products　Company41　but　it　is　possible　that
the　Court（or　young　legal　clerks）knew　the　idea　of　level　of　judicial　scrutiny　in七he
US．
　　There　may　be　narrower　scope　for　operation　of　the　presumption　of　constitu－
tionali七y　when　legislation　appears　on　its　face　to　be　within　a　specific　prohibi一
七ion　of七he　Constitution，　such　as　those　of　the丘rst　ten　amendments，　which　are
deemed　equally　specific　when　held　to　be　embraced　within　the　R〕urteen七h．．．
　　It　is　unnecessary　to　consider　now　whether　legislation　which　restricts　those
political　processes　which　can　ordinarily　be　expec七ed七〇bring　abou七repeal　of
undesirable　legislation，　is　to　be　subjec七ed七〇more　exac七ing　judicial　scru七iny
39Supreme　Court（GB），judgment　of　30　April　1975，　Minshu　29－4－572．
40http：／／www．courts．gQ．jp／english／judgments／text／1975．0430－1968－Gyo－Tsu－No．120，html〈visited
　30／07／2008＞．
41304US．144（1938），
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under　the　genera1　prohibitions　of　the　Fourteenth　Amendment　than　are　most
other　types　of　legislation．
　　Nor　need　we　enquire　whether　similar　considerations　en七er　into七he　review　of
statutes　direc七ed　at　par七icular　religious＿or　national＿or　racial　minorities
．．．：whether　prejudice　against　discre七e　and　insular　minorities　may　be　a　special
colldition，　which　tends　seriously七〇curtail　the　operation　of　those　political
processes　ordinarily七〇be　religd　upon　to　protect　minorities，　and　which　may
cal1　for　a　correspondingly　more　searchillg　judicial　inquiry．42
　Ironically，七he　Japanese　Supreme　Court　has　never　admitted　a　violation　of　the
Article　21　which　guarantees　the　freedom　of　expression　in　any　cases．　The　level　of
scrutiny　for　freedom　of　expression　cases　which　the　Cour七adop七ed　has　been　often
criticised　that　it　was　not　strict　enough　to　pro七ec七freedom　of　expression．
4．2．2．　Public　Safety　Ordinance（10　September　1975）43
　　The　case　is　concerned　with　the　group　parades　and　de画ons七rations　which　violated
七he　Public　Safety　Ordinance　of　Tokushima　City　and　the　Road　Tra伍c　Law．　The
appellants　claimed　tha七七he　legislation　violates　the　Article　310f　Cons七itutional　Law
（due　process）as　it　was　not　clearly　written七〇enable　them七〇uhderstand．
　　This　case　showed　characteristics　of　opinions　of　the　Supreme　Cour七which　I　clari丘ed
in　sec七ion　3．　Firs七ly，七he　majority　opinion　did　no七refer　to　nor　ci七e　any　foreign
case　law．　Secondly，　one　of　the　concurring　opinions　shows　strong　a伍ni七y七〇the　US
Supreme　Cour七case　law．　The　Judge　Kishi　referred　to　historical　vicissitudes　of七he
clear　and　present　danger　tes七〇f　the　US　case　law　in　order　to　show　the　extent　of　the
doctrine。
　　The　Judicial　precedents　of　the　United　States　Supreme　Cour七apply　the
principle　of‘‘clear　and　present　danger，’in　deciding　con七inuality　［sic］44　be－
cause　the　purpose　of　regulations　is　to　control　the　expressions　as　they　are，　and
it　is　striving　to　decide　the　constitutionality　of　such　regulations　by　a　strict
standard．　The　principle　was　originally　used　for　deciding七he　constitutionality
of　punishing　the　acts　such　as　instigation　or　agitation　of七he　acts　that　cause
asubstantial　harmful　effect　that　may　be　constitutionally　prevented　by　the
nation．　The　grounds　for　the　control　can　be　seen　in七he　idea　that　those　ex－
pressions　that　may　cause　imminent　danger　of　a　substantial　harmful　effect　can
be　regarded　as　an　ac七ion　causing　such　a　harmful　effect，　therefore，　there　is　Ilo
time　to　wait　for　a　natural　con七rol　by　exchange　of　free　expressions．　The　said
principle　has　been　applied　widely　especially　since　the　1930s　and　in　deciding
the　con七rol　over　the　acts　of　freedom　to　be　unconsti七utional，　the　phrase　has
appeared　like　a　cliche，　however，　consideration　has　been　accumulated　on　the
421d，　footnote　4，
43Supreme　Court（GB），　judgment　of　10　September　1975，
　1（eishu）29－8－489．
44The　original　Japanese　text　is　constitutionality．
Sαikou　Sαibαnsho　Ke勿¢Hαnreishu（hereinafter
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scope　of　its　application，　and　in　1950，　it　has　become　clarified　tha七the　princi－
ple　does　not　apply七〇every　case，　as　it　does　not　apply　to　the　case　where七he
purpose　of　control　is七〇prevent　the　critical　and　harmful　effect　caused　by　the
ac七ion．　In　1951，　i七was　pointed　out七hat　the　principle　had　been　widely　applied
to　cases　where　guaranteed　interests　are　insignificant　and　are　not　suf丑cien七七〇
regard　the　control　as　constitu七ional．　Even　for　the　control　tha七intends　to
prevent七he　harmful　effect　of　expressions七hemselves，　when　the　interes七s　to　be
guaran七eed　are　extremely　important，　the　range　of　control　can　be　expanded
and　with　respect　to　the　application　of　the　priIlciple，　it　has　become　evident
that七he　considera七ion　is　required　by　means　of　weighing　up　the　advantages
and　disadvantages．　In　1965，　it　was　decided　tha七七he　acts　bf　parades　and
gatherings　are　a　mixture　of　action　and　expression，　therefore，　in　order　to　pre－
ven七asubstantial　harmful　e舐ec七caused　by七he　phase　of　ac七ion，七〇punish　a
demons七ration　in　the　neighborhood　of　the　courts　is　cons七itutional．　In　1968，
with　respect　to　a　case　of　a　symbolic　action，　tha七is　the　act　of　burning　a　draft
card　in　public，　when　an　act　of　speech　and　non－speech　are　combined七〇〇ne
action　and　a　suf丑cient　national　in七erests　can　be　seen　in　controlling　the　phase
of　non－speech，　it　is　no七unconstitutional　to　restric七七he　freedom　of　expression
that　was　accompanied　by　the　restriction．　Fur七her，　in　the　judicial　preceden七
in　1973，　which　decided　tha七prohibition　of　political　action　by　public　ofHcials
is　cons七itutional，　an　impor七ant　considera七ion　was　given　to　the　dis七inc七ion　be－
tween　a　genuine　speech　and　a　speech　with　action．
　　It　goes　without　saying　that　I　do　not　doctrinally　fbllow　the　judicial　prece－
den七s　in　the　U・S・Among　the　said　summarized　judicial　precedents，　there　are
opposing　opinions　which　are　worth　listening　to，　however，　some　of　the　cases
have　a　differen七nature　of　con七ent　from　those　in　ques七ion　in　Japan．　Nev－
er七heless，七he　reason　for　having　ci七ed　them，　I　think　it　is　worthwhile　paying
attention　to　the　change　of　apPlication　of七he　principle　in七he　above　judicial
precedents．　That　is，1七hink　it　is　impor七ant　to　consider七hat　the　change　of　its
application　was　not　deducted　by　mere　logic，　bu七as　a　resu1t　of　induction　based
on　experience，七he　emphasis　is　placed　on　the　choice　of　ra七ional　values　in七he
judicial　procedure，　and　even　if　there　was　an　age　of　expanding　the　applica七ion
of　the　principle，　these　days，　i七has　been　consciously　used　as　a　standard　for
deciding　the　constitutionality　of　the　control　over　expressions．45
　　Thirdly，　the　reason　Judge　Kishi　invoked　the　US　case　law　is　not　for　admi七ting　a
viola七ion　of　the　Consti七ution，　but　for　limiting　the　exten七〇f　protection　of　freedom　of
expression．　The　same　attitude　can　be　observed　in　other　cases（3．2．3）．
45http・／／www…u・t・・9・・jp／・ngli・h／j・dgm・nt・／t・xt／1975．09．10－1973－A－N・910，html〈・i・it・d　30／07／2008＞
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4．2．3．　Separation　of　Government　and　Religion（Lal’cit6）（13　July　1977）46：
the　Purpose－Effect　Tbst　and　the正emon　Test
　　The　case　is　concerned　wi七h　the　constitutionality　of　the　ac七〇f　local　government
which　presided　a　ceremony　in　a　Shinto　style（Jichinsai47）which　are　often　performed
before　a　construc七ion　of　buildings　in　Japan　to　pray　fbr、safety．　The　issue　is　whether
the　ceremony　is　a　religious　activi七y　which　is　prohibi七ed　for　central　and　local　govern－
ments　under　the　Constitution（Art　20　and　89）or　a　social　cus七〇m　the　people　expect
the　local　government　to　do　so　for　safety　of　cons七ruction　work．
　　The　cour七showed　a　test　to　decide　whether　the　act　in　question　was　constitutional
or　no七．
　　…“religious　activity”should　not　be　taken　to　mean　all　activities　of　the
State　and　i七s　organs　which　bring　them　into　contact　with　religion，　but　only
those　which　bring　abou七contact　exceeding七he　aforesaid　reasonable　limi七s　and
which　have　a　religiously　significant　purpose，　or　the　effec七〇f　which　is　to　pro－
mo七e，　subsidize，　or，　conversely，　interfere　with　or　oppose　religion．　The　prime
example　of　such　ac七ivities　is　the　propagation　or　dissemination　of　religion，　such
as　religious　educa七iol1，　which　is　explicitly　prohibited　in　Article　20，　Paragraph
3；but　other　religious　activi七ies　like　celebrations，　rites，　and　ceremonies　are　not
automatically　excluded　if　their　purpose　and　effects　are　as　s七ated　above．　Thus，
in　determining　whether　a　particular　act　constitutes　proscribed　religious　ac一
七ivity，　ex七ernal　aspec七s　such　as　whether　a　religious　figure　o缶ciates　or　whether
the　proceedings　fbllow　a　religiously　prescribed　form　should　not　be七he　only
fac七〇rs　considered．　The　totality　of　the　circumstances，　including七he　place　of
the　activity，　whe七her　the　average　person　views　it　as　a　religious　ac七，　the　ac－
tor’s．intent，　purpose，　and　degree（if　any）of　religious　consciousness，　and　the
effects　on七he　average　person，　should　be七aken　into　considera七ion　to　reach　an
objective　judgment　based　on　socially　accepted　ideas．48
　　The　stark　similarities（using　the　same　words　such　as　purpose　and　effect）between
the　above　purpose－effect　tes七and　the　Lemon　test　of　the　US　Supreme　Court　was
poin七ed　out　by　Japanese　scholars　although　the　Court　did　not　cite　Lemon　v　Kurtz－
　　　　49man．
　　Every　analysis　in　this　area　must　begin　with　consideration　of　the　cumulative
cri七eria　developed　by　the　Court　over　many　years．　Three　such　tests　may　be
gleaned　from　our　cases．　Firs七，　the　statu七e　must　have　a　secular　legisla七ive
purpose；second，　its　principal　or　primary　effec七must　be　one　that　nei七her
46Supreme　Court（GB），judgment　of　13　July　1977，ハ4inshu　31－4－533．
47Areligious　ceremony　to　pray　for　a　god　of　earth　not　to　be　disturbed　by　the　construction．
48http：／／www．courts．go．jp／english／judgments／text／1977．7．13－1971．－Gyo－Tsu－．No＿69．html〈visited
　30／07／2008＞（The　underlines　are　added　by　the　author）．
49　Lemon　v．　KUtzmαn，403　U．S．602（1971）．
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advances　nor　inhibi七s　religion，　Boαrd　of　Educαtion　v．　Allen，392　U．S，236，243
（1968）；［403U．S．602，613］且nally，　the　statute　must　not　fos七er“an　excessive
government　en七anglement　wi七h　religion．”VVαlz，　supra，　at　674．50
　　Taking　into　account　the　fact　that　the　Court　had　no　experiences　of　how　to　ill七er－
pret　the　separation　clause　before，　it　can　be　easily　imagined　that七he　Court　consulted
七he　case　law　of七he　US　Supreme　Court　since　some　clauses　of七he　Japanese　Consti－
tution　are　largely　modelled　on　the　US　Constitution　and　particularly　Article　200f
the　Japanese　Constitution　is　considered　to　be　influenced　by　the　First　Amendment　of
the　US　Consti七ution．　The　lat七er　point　was　raised　by　the　dissen七ing　opinion　of　Judge
Fujibayashi．　After　all，　introduction　of七he　principle　of　separation　of　government　and
religion　was　one　of　the　principal　policies　of　the　occupation　period。　Therefore，　it　is
diMcult　to　say　tha七七he　Court　never　received　any　influences　from七he　US　case　law．
　　When　the　purpose－effec七七est　and　Lemon七est　are　observed　carefully，　there　are
significant　differences．　Befbre　analysing　the　differences，　an　impor七ant　difference
between　the　original　Japanese七ext　and　the　translated　English七ext　which　I　use　in
my　article　has　to　be　pointed　out．　The　latter七ransla七ed　the　importapt　part　of七he
judgment　in　which七he　purpose－effect　test　was　recognised　as
　　＿“religious　activity”should　not　be七aken　to　mean　all　activities　of　the　State
and　its　organs　which　bring七hem　in七〇contac七with　religion，　but　only　those
which　bring　about　con七ac七exceeding　the　aforesaid　reasonable　limits　and　which
have　a　religiously　significant　purpose，Ωエthe　effect　of　which　is　to　promote，
subsidize，　or，　conversely，　interfere　with　or　oppose　religion．5i
　　This　means七hat　if　the　religious　activity　has（a）areligiously　significant　purpose，
or（2）the　effec七〇f　which　is　to　promo七e，　subsidize，　interfere　or　oppose　religion，　the
activity　is　unconsti七utionaL　However，　in　the　original　Japanese　version，　it　is　no七clear
whether　it　is　necessary七〇satisfy（a）or（b）or（a）and（b）in　order　to　recognise　the
ac七ivity　as　unconsti七utional．　Probably，　according　to　the　ordinary　Japanese　usage，　it
is　more　natural　to　interpret　the　Japanese　original　text　as（a）and（b）．52　However，　as
Itook　the　English　text　from七he　o伍cial　website　of　the　Supreme　Cour七，　ill　this　article
Istick　with　the　English　text　on　the　premise　that（a）or（b）is　the　oflicial　view．
　　The　Lemon　test　requires　the　government　to　ful丘l　all七hree　coIldi七ions　in　order七〇
be　a¢cepted　as　consti七u七ionaL　If　any　of七hese　three　conditions　are　viola七ed，　the　gov－
ernment　act　is　considered　as　unconsti七utional．　On　the　other　hand，　according七〇the
Japanese　test　if　the　governmen七act　has　a　religiously　significant　purpose，　or　the　effect
of　the　act　is　to　promote，　subsidize，　or，　conversely，　in七erfere　wi七h　or　oppose　religion，
the　act　is　deemed　unconstitutional．　Moreover，　the　Japanese　one　does　not　include　a
third　requirement　of七he　Lemon　test（“an　excessive　government　en七anglement　with
religion”）．　Therefore，　the　judgement　was　criticised　that　the　Supreme　Court　of　Japan
501d．　The　underlines　are　added　by　the　author．
51The　undetline　is　added　by　the　author．
52Th・・equi・em・nt・・（・）and（b）m・kes　the　ext・nt・f　un・・n・tit・ti・nal・eligi・u・a。ti。ity。。rr。w。，．
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softened七he　Lemon七es七in　order七〇allow　the　government　to　do　questionable　religious
activities．
　　The　advantage　of　not　o伍cially　citing　the　foreign　case　law　may　be　to　protect　the
Cour七from七he　cri七icism．53　After　all，　the　Court　did　not　cite　the　US　case　law．
Therefore，　criticism　upon　the　Lemon七es七is　not　directly　applicable　to　the　J’apanese
Court．　However，　if　this　is　an　academic　work，　i七would　be　called　as　plagiarism　or　at
leaS七miSqUOta七iOn．
　　Probably七he　problem　of七he　hidden　influence（not　disclosing　the　source）is　that
there　is　no　clear　explanation　why　the　ptirpose－effect　test　can　draw七he　line　between
七he　prohibi七ed　religious　act　and　permissible　religious　act．　On　the　contrary，　the
US　Supre即e　Court　established　the　test　by　consideration　of　the　cumulative　criteria
developed　by　the　Court　over　many　years．　The　legitimacy　and　ra七ionali七y　of七he　US
七es七is　supPor七ed　by　fac七s　and　experiences．
　　The　purpose－effect　test　was　so　influential　that　courts　never　failed七〇use　the　test　in
cases　concerning　the　principle　of　separation　of　government　and　religion（see，3．2．3．2）
since七he　1977　judgement．　However，　some　scholars　poin七〇ut　that　the　purpose－
effec七test　is　not　always　applicable　and　adequate　for　cases　concerning　the　separation
principle．　If　the　origin　of　Japanese　purpose－effec七七est　is七he　US　case　law，　then　it
is　more　produc七ive七〇disclose　the　origin　and　examine七〇what　extent　the　US　case
law　is　relevant，　taking　into　account　the　differences　of　facts　and　backgrounds．　A
thorough　and－exhaustive　comparison　between　the　Japanese　and　US　cases（including
similarities　and　differences　of　cultural　and　historical　backgrounds）helps　clarifying　a
possible　extent　of　the　purpose－effect　test．　If　the　origin　of　the　test　is　no七the　US　case
law，　it　is　important　to　analyse　all　the　cases　concerning　separation　of　governmen七
and　religion　in　order七〇re－examin6　the　ex七en七〇f七he　purpose－effect　test．
4．2．4．　Prohibition　on　Leaflet　Distribution（18　December　1984）54：Pub－
lic　Forum　Doctrine
　　The　case　concerned　with　the　freedom　of　expression　as　distribution　of　political
leaflet　at　a　railway　station　run　by　a　private　railway　company．　The　appellants　claimed
that　criminalising　their　act　of　distribution　of　leaflet　was　unconstitutional．　The　ma－
jority　opinion　simply　denied七he　appellants’claim．　The　majority　admitted　that　the
Article　21　did　not　guarantee　absolute　freedom　of　expression　and　permi七ted　a　neces－
sary　and　reasonable　restraint　on　freedom　of　expression．1七did　not　show　any　specific
test　to　judge　constitutionality　nor　adopt　a　stricter　scru七iny．　This　is　the　exact　ex－
ample　that　the‘bourt　has　not　introduce　a　stricter　scrutiny　and　a　stricter　test　for
freedom　of　expression（see，4．2．1）．55
　　The　interesting　characteristic　of七his　case　is　the　concurring　opinion　of　Judge　Ito
who　was　an　Anglo－American　law　professor　before　he　joined　the　Cour七（see，4．1）．　In
531n　the　United　States，　using　of　foreign　precedents　has　b6en　controversial　and　the　media　criticised　some
　Justices　of　the　Supreme　Court　who　have　cited　foreign　law，　See，　Reed，　supra　note　1，　at　253．　Cf，，　Gins－
　burg，“A　Decent　Respect　to　the　Opinions’of［Human］kind：the　Value　of　a　Comparative　Perspective　in
　Constitutional　Adjudication”（2005）640LJ　575．
54Supreme　Court（Third　Bench），judgment　of　18　December　1984，　Keishu　38－12－3026．
551七should　be　reminded　tha七the　judgemen七was　given　not　by　Grand　Bench　but　the　Third　Bench．
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his　opinion，　he　introduced　a　concept　of“public　forum”where　freedom　of　expression
has　to　be　guaranteed　as　carefully　as　possible　in　order　to　secure　a　place（public　forum）
where　people　can　communicate七heir　opinion　to　other　people　in　an　effec七ive　way．
The　English　words“public　fbrum”were　no七translated　but　wri七七en　as“puburikku
fouramu”56（パブリック・フォーラム）．、Therefore　it　is　very　clear　that　the　concept
is　imported　from　outside，　i．e．，　the　US　case　law．　However，　he　did　Ilo七cite　any　of　the
US　case　law　concerning　the　public　forum　doctrine．　It　is　interes七ing　to　collsider　why
he　mentioned七he　public　forum　doctrine　because七hat　he　joined　the　majori七y　opinion
and　sta七ed　that　the　place　in　ques七ion　did　no七have白七rong　nature　of　public　forum．
4．2．5．
Test
Use　of　City　Hall（7　March　1995）57：Clear　and　Present　Danger
　　The　case　is　concerned　with　refusal　of　the　permit　to　use　of　a　ci七y　hall　for　political
meetillg（a　political　campaign　of七he　lef七ist　group　against　a　planning　fbr　a　new
airport）．　The　organiser　of　the　mee七ing　claimed　tha七七he　refusal　by　the　ci七y　council
violated　freedom　of　expression　and　association（Article　210f　the　Constitution）and
the　refusal　was　censorship　which　the　constitution　prohibited（Article　21，　paragraph
2）．The　Court　admit七ed　the　refusal．as　cons七itutional（one　concurring　opinion）．
　　Ichoose　this　as　the　last　example　because　it　includes　points　I　raised．　Moreover，　it
can　show　a　typical　situa七ion　of　case　law　building　by　the　Supreme　Cour七〇f　Japan．
First，七he　principal　issue　of七he　case　is　freedom　of　expressi6n　to　which　the　Cour七has
never　admitted　the　violation　of七he　Consti七u七ion　and　i七did　not　in七his　case．
　　Secondly，　the　similarities　of　the　wording　of　the　scrutiny　test　between　the　Japanese
and七he　US　case　law　is　found．　The　Court　required　the　city　council　to　f（）resee　a　clear
and　present　danger　in　order　to　refuse　the　permi七〇f　city　ha1L　The　Schenk　v．　United
States　established七he　test　in　1919　but　there　is　no　cita七ion　of　it　by　the　Japanese　side．
　　The　ques七ion　in　every　case　is　whether　the　words　used　are　used　in　such．
circums七ances　and　are　of　such　a　nature　as　to　create　a　clear　and　present　dan－
ger　that　they　will　bring　about　the　substantive　evils　that　the　United　S七a七es
Congress　has　a　righ七to　prevent．　It　is　a　question　of　proximi七y　and　degree．
When　a　na七ion　is　at　war，　many　things　that　might　be　said　in　time　of　peace
are　such　a　hindrance七〇its　effor七七hat七heir　u七terance　will　not　be　endured　so
long　as　men　fight，　and　that　no　Court　could　regard　them　as　protected　by　any
constitutional　right．58
　　Thirdly，　because　of　the　accumula七ion　of　Japanese　case　law　as　its　own，　it　seems
that　the　Court　becQmes　less　likely七〇mention七he　case　law　of　foreign　countries．
561n　Japan　foreign　words　are　often　written　or　spoken　as　they　sound　ill　Katakana．　Katakana（one　of　three
　characters　of　Japanese）is　used　to　make　the　people　nQtice　that　they　are　foreign　words．　The　advantage
　of　this　usage　is　that　they　don’t　need　to　translate　them．　The　disadvantage　is　that　they　accept　the　words
　without　seriously　thinking　what　they　mean，　Moreover，　it　is　very　likely　that　how　to　read　the　words　are
　greatly　innuenced　by　Japanese．　E．g．，　public　forum　is　pronounced　as　pu－bu－ri－kku　fo－u－ra－mu　in　Katakana．
57Supreme　Court（Third　Bench），judgment　of　7　March　1995，ハ4inshu　49－3－687．
58　Schenck　v．　United　Stαtes，249　US．47（1919）．
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Instead，　the　Court　cites　its　own　case　law．　However，　there　are　some　problems　from　a
perspective　of　case　law　building．　For　example，　the　Court　referred七〇七he　j　udgment
of　23　December　1953　which　was　no七ra七io　decidendi　but　obiter　dictum　on　the　mat七er
in　ques七ion．59　The　Court　referred　to　the　judgemen七〇f　l　l　June　1986600f　which　facts
and　contex七are　differen七from　the　case　in　question．　Similar　problems　are　widely
recognised　in　other　cases．　The　concept　and　principle　of七he’垂窒?モ?р?獅煤@is　relativ ly
ambiguous　and　loose．
5． Interim　Conclusions　and　Implications
　　In　my　view，七he　in且uence　of　foreign　law　or　case　law　a七七he　Supreme　Court　seems
relatively　bigger七han　scholars　have　empirically七hought　if　the　hidden　in且uences　are
taken　in七〇account．　Majori七y　opinions　of　the　Court　have　received　hidden　influences
from　foreign　case　law，　particularly　the　case　law　of七he　US　Supreme　Court．　One　of
the　judges　of　the　Supreme　Cour七〇f　Japan　clearly　stated　tha七i七is　not　acceptable　to
deny　the　importance　of　foreign　experiences　although　it　was　in　his　dissen七ing　opinion．
　　The　problems　are，　however，　fbreign　case　law　is　ra七her　randomly　and　arbitrarily
used　when　it　is　convenient　for　judges　to　use　it　in　order　to　reinforce　their　reasoning
or　argument．　Besides　since七he　j　udges　do　not　show　citation　of　foreign　case　law　when
they　mention　or　indirec七lyμ七ilise　it，　it　is　di缶cul七to　find　a　case　referred．　After　all
the　me七hod　for　cita七ion　of　precedents　of　Japanese　case　law　itself　is　problematic　as　it
does　not　show七he　number　of　the　page　or　paragraph　the　Court　cites．　This　is　a　grea七
difference　between　the　Japanese　jurisdiction　and　common　law　jurisdictions．
　　Iconclude　the　article　by　an　a七tempt　to　answer　further　constitutional　and　inter－
national　legal　questions　which　I　raised　in　the　beginning．　Firs七ly，　as　to　the　existence
of　a　trans－judicial　dialogue　between　cour七s，七he　word“trans－judicial　dialogue”needs
七〇be　clari且ed　in　order　to　have　a　productive　and　subs七an七ial　discussion．　If　a‘‘trans－
judicial　dialogue”means　a　situation　where　a　court　of　the　coun七ry　A　refers　to　or　cites
the　country　B，s　case　law　and　vice　versa，　then　Japanese　situation　is　no七adialogue
but　one－sided　import．　Justice　Ginsburg　once　wrote：
　　If　US　experience　and　decisions　can　be　ins七ruc七ive七〇systems　that　have　more
recently　instituted　or　invigorated　judicial　review　for　constitutionali七y，　so　we
can　learn　from　others　now　engaged　in　measuring　ordinary　Iaws　and　executive
action　agains七charters　securing　basic　rights．61
　　Sillce　her　view　is　con七roversial　in　the　contex七〇f　the　United　States，　the　possibility
of　an　equal　dialogue　remains　to　be　seen．　On　the　other　hand，　the　growing　in七erest
in　compara七ive　law　in　the　States　and　Europe　supports　to　develop　a　dialogue　in　a
positive　way．　In　Japanese　context　more　attention　should　be　given七〇the　necessity
59　The　judgement　of　23　December　1953　dismissed　the　appeal　because　it　did　not　have　a　legal　interest　to　be
　protec七ed．　Therefore　what　the　judgement　examined　as　the　issue　of　constitutionality　Qf　the　refusal　of　the
　permit　as“reference，，　canno七be　precedent．
601t　is　concerned・with　the　injunction　to　prevent　the　defamation　against　an　electoral　candidate　by　a　journalist．
61Ginsburg，　supra　note　53，576．
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of　legitimacy　and　me七hodology　of　using　foreign　precedents　in　order　to　avoid　mis－
use　of　foreign　precedents　and　achieve　a　consistent　and　produc七ive．use　of　foreign
preceden七s．　I　also　would　like　to　emphasise　the　possibili七y　that　the　existence　of七he
European　Court　of　Human　Righ七s　greatly　promote　the“七ransjudicial　dialogue”by
the　accumulation　of七he　case　law　of　the　European　Court　of　Human　Rights　in　the
European　context．　The　case　law　of　the　European　Court　of　Human　Righ七s　can　be
recognised　as　semi－cons七itutional　cases　since　many　of　the　cases　were　deal七by　either
the　constitutiona1　courts　or　supreme　cour七s　of　a　Contracting　State　before　they　went
to　Strasbourg　and　the　European　Cour七七akes　into　account七he　domestic　judgments．
　　Secondly，　as　to　the　convergence　of　the　common　law　and　ciマil　law　traditions，　there
is　a　convergence　of七he　common　law　and　civil　law　tradition　in　Japan　in　an　unself－
COnSClOUS　Way・
　　Lastly，　it　can　be　safely　said　tha七七he　Supreme　Court　of　Japan　accepted　universalism
of　human　rights　as　an　ideal　or　a　principle．　However，　it　is　a　crucial　ma七七er　that
how　human　righ七s　are　implemented　in　the　Japanese　context．　Particularly　from
aperspective　of　judicial　implemelltation　of　human　rights，　there　are　many　practical
and　theoretical　issues　to　be　tackled　wi七h．　I　suppose　that　foreign　precedent　is　a　source
of　knowledge　and　experiences　to　explore　how　the　general　and　abstract　wording　of
human　rights　clauses　can　be　in七erpreted．
